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IS IT “A” OR IS IT “THE”?  DECIPHERING
THE MOTIVATING-FACTOR STANDARD IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND
RETALIATION CASES
By: Kendall D. Isaac1
ABSTRACT
The recent Supreme Court decision in University of Texas Southwestern
Medical Center v. Nassar has brought exposure to a prevalent problem in
employment discrimination and retaliation cases: there is great discrepancy in
how plaintiffs have to prove and courts have to assess these claims.  Depend-
ing on whether the case is based on discrimination or retaliation pursuant to
the ADA, ADEA, or Title VII, the standard that needs to be met might be that
the plaintiff must prove that discrimination was “the” motivating-factor for the
adverse employment action or that it was “a” motivating-factor for the action.
Adding even greater confusion is the fact that, if an employee argues that they
are the victim of discrimination (such as on the basis of national origin) and
retaliation, the employee might have to prove that their national origin was
“a” motivating-factor in the discrimination case and “the” motivating-factor in
the retaliation aspect of the case.
If this sounds confusing to scholars and attorneys, imagine how confusing
these various standards within one case can be for potential litigants, judges
unfamiliar with employment law, and a member of the jury!  This Article
delves into these muddy waters and attempts to highlight the issues, spotlight
the statutes, and ultimately formulate a working motivating-factor standard
that can be infused into all of the various employment discrimination statutes
and thus result in a consistency in interpretation and application.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Heads the employer wins, tails the employee loses.”2  This state-
ment precisely underscores the problematic court interpretations rela-
tive to the interplay between anti-discrimination and retaliation
statutes, and whether the statutes in question call for a single-motive
(but-for, or “the” motivating-factor) or mixed-motive (a coexistent il-
legitimate and legitimate reason for the adverse employment action,
or essentially using the “a” motivating-factor standard while allowing
all of the evidence to factor into the ultimate level of employer liabil-
ity) assessment of the motivating-factor standard in employment dis-
crimination and retaliation cases.  The Supreme Court, in particular,
seems to be interpreting the motivating-factor standards within these
statutes in a way that will result in a victory for the employer at the
expense of the employee.  Instead, what the Court should be doing is
interpreting the statutes according to Congressional intent.  While
logic suggests that the best course of action is for Congress to provide
consistency and clarity relative to the motivating-factor standards for
the various anti-discrimination and retaliation statutes, such as Title
VII, the ADA, and the ADEA, the level of dysfunction3 systemic in
today’s legislature makes such a premise unlikely.  Nevertheless, this
Article ventures to explore the current path of the courts as it relates
to interpreting the standard a plaintiff must meet in these employment
actions, and subsequently what steps are most apropos to allow these
2. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2545 (2013) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
3. Dimond, Diane, There Ought to Be a Law Against an “Incompetent” Congress,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 29, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/diane-dimond/
there-ought-to-be-a-law-a_b_3522154.html?utm_hp_ref=tw.
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statutes to be more seamless and less subject to creative court inter-
pretation.  While this Author ultimately favors the usage of an “a”
motivating-factor standard rather than the more restrictive “the” mo-
tivating-factor standard, what is most important is the usage of a con-
sistent standard between statutes and in the analysis of both
discrimination and retaliation claims.
Among the courts, there seems to be a great deal of confusion re-
garding motivating-factor standards in employment discrimination
claims.  Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act, and other such acts all essentially
have the same goal:  to prevent discrimination in the workplace based
on factors such as race, sex, age, disability, religion, national origin,
etc.  However, the standard that must be met in order to prove such
discrimination varies depending upon which statute the suit is brought
under.  In the wake of the June 24, 2013, Supreme Court Nassar deci-
sion, there seems to be a differentiation in how discrimination versus
retaliation cases are analyzed as well.  Confusion may be alleviated if
there was one motivating-factor standard rather than one for each
statute.  This Article will first look at background cases that under-
score the development and current state of the various statutory moti-
vating-factor standards.  It will then delve into an analysis of the
standards generally and the University of Texas Southwestern Medical
Center v. Nassar Supreme Court decision specifically.  Finally, this Ar-
ticle will conclude with a proposed singular standard that could ease
the confusion for all of the employment discrimination statutes as well
as the rationale for having such a standard.
II. BACKGROUND
In cases of employment discrimination, there are various statutes an
individual can file suit under based on the reason the individual is
alleging discrimination.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 pro-
hibits employment discrimination “because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”4  The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) makes it unlawful for an employer
to discriminate against an individual “because of such individual’s
age.”5  Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)
makes it unlawful to “discriminate against a qualified individual on
the basis of disability.”6  These statutes also provide that retaliatory
conduct towards someone who alleges discrimination or participates
in assisting someone in the advancement of a discrimination claim is
unlawful.7
4. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000(e)-2(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2013).
5. 29 U.S.C.S. § 623(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2013).
6. 42 U.S.C.S. § 12112(a) (LexisNexis 2013).
7. See generally 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000(e)-2(a)(1); 29 U.S.C.S. § 623(a)(1); 42
U.S.C.S. § 12112(a).
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Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins set employment discrimination cases on a path away from a
but-for or “the” motivating-factor standard and towards a more lib-
eral “a” motivating-factor standard.8 Price Waterhouse considered the
because-of language in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in
mixed-motive cases and stated that “while an employer may not take
gender into account in making an employment decision (except in
those very narrow circumstances in which gender is a BFOQ [or bona
fide occupational qualification]), it is free to decide against a woman
for other reasons.”9  Consequently, the following standard emerged:
[O]nce a plaintiff in a Title VII case shows that gender played a
motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may
avoid a finding of liability only by proving that it would have made
the same decision even if it had not allowed gender to play such a
role.10
As Justice Brennan stated in the holding of Price Waterhouse, in a
plurality of four Justices:
[W]hen a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her gender played
a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may
avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it
had not taken the plaintiff’s gender into account.11
This rule emerged as the standard under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.
However, just two years after Price Waterhouse, Congress passed a
new law amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.12  The
Civil Rights Act of 1991 enacted two new standards in mixed-motive
cases.13  The first standard states the following:  “Except as otherwise
provided in this subchapter [(42 USCS §§ 2000e et seq.)], an unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining party dem-
onstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a moti-
vating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors
also motivated the practice.”14  The second standard provides that
“the employer has a limited affirmative defense that does not absolve
it of liability, but restricts the remedies available to a plaintiff.”15  A
plaintiff’s remedies include only “declaratory relief, certain types of
injunctive relief [(limited)], and attorney’s fees and costs.”16  It should
8. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
9. Id. at 244.
10. Id. at 244–45.
11. Id. at 258.
12. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 (2003).
13. Id. at 94.
14. Id.; 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(m) (LexisNexis 2013).
15. Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 94.
16. Id.; 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (LexisNexis 2013).
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be noted that the Supreme Court in its Nassar decision, discussed later
in this Article, essentially eviscerates the relevance of Price
Waterhouse because its underlying premise is codified in the 1991
amendment to Title VII.
The remainder of this section is comprised of cases relevant to this
topic, the first representing the “pretext case” under Title VII.
A. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
In this case Percy Green, an African-American male, worked for
McDonnell Douglas Corp. as a mechanic and laboratory technician.17
Due to a general reduction in the corporation’s workforce, Green was
laid off.18  Green applied for reemployment when McDonnell Doug-
las began advertising for jobs in which he was qualified.19  Green,
however, was rejected for the job because he participated in a “stall-
in” and “lock-in,” relating to the civil rights movement.20  Green
claimed that “his discharge and the general hiring practices of [Mc-
Donnell Douglas] were racially motivated.”21  Green filed suit under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.22  The Court held that while
Title VII does not require an employer to rehire an employee who has
been discharged, it does not allow the employer to use the employee’s
actions “as a pretext for the sort of discrimination prohibited by
§ 703(a)(1).”23  The employee must “be afforded a fair opportunity to
show that . . . [the employer’s] stated reason for . . . [the employee’s]
rejection was in fact pretext.”24  Essentially this means that the em-
ployee must be given a fair opportunity “to demonstrate by compe-
tent evidence” that the reasons for which the employee was rejected
“were in fact a cover-up for a racially discriminatory decision.”25
B. Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.
In this case, Jack Gross began working for FBL Financial Services,
Inc. in 1971 and had achieved the position of claims administration
director by 2001.26  In 2003, at age 54, Gross was reassigned as claims
project coordinator, which he considered to be a demotion, and trans-
ferred many of his responsibilities to a lady put in a newly created
position, who happened to be in her early forties.27  Gross filed suit
alleging that his reassignment was a violation under the ADEA, a
17. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 794 (1973).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 796.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 794.
22. Id. at 797.
23. Id. at 804.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 805.
26. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 170 (2009).
27. Id.
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statute prohibiting discrimination against an employee “because of
such individual’s age.”28  A big issue in this case was the mix up be-
tween the standards set forth under Title VII and the ADEA; the
ADEA is not governed by Title VII decisions (such as Price
Waterhouse).29  The following is the ADEA standard:  “To establish a
disparate-treatment claim under the plain language of the ADEA,
therefore, a plaintiff must prove that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the
employer’s adverse decision.”30  The plaintiff must prove this claim by
a preponderance of the evidence, using either direct or circumstantial
evidence.31  In this instance, the burden of persuasion does not shift to
the employer to show that the same action would have been taken
despite the employee’s age.32
C. Quantum Chemical Corp. v. Toennies
This case involves a Texas statute, the Texas Commission on Human
Rights Act (TCHRA), which is patterned after Title VII.33  Ralf Toen-
nies worked for DuPont, which was bought by Quantum Chemical, as
an engineer.34  He was promoted in 1989.35  Prior to 1994, Toennies
had received satisfactory employee evaluations; however, in early
1994, he received an employee evaluation indicating his performance
was below expectations, which occurred just after he started reporting
to a new supervisor.36  At age 55, Toennies lost his job in late 1994.37
Toennies filed suit under the TCHRA “alleging that age discrimina-
tion motivated the firing.”38  The court held that an employment dis-
crimination plaintiff must “show that discrimination was a motivating
factor in an adverse employment decision.”39  The court stated that
two types of employment discrimination cases exist under Title VII:
(1) the pretext case (McDonnell Douglas) and (2) the mixed-motive
case (Price Waterhouse).40  However, this state statute does not differ-
entiate between these two types of cases because the federal courts
are not united on how to apply the Title VII standard.41  Therefore,
the statute’s plain meaning constitutes the standard.42
28. Id.
29. Id. at 173.
30. Id. at 176.
31. Id. at 177–78.
32. Id. at 180.




37. Id. at 474–75.
38. Id. at 475.
39. Id. at 482.
40. Id. at 476.
41. Id. at 482.
42. Id.
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D. Woodson v. Scott Paper Co.
In this case James W. Woodson, an African-American employee,
sued his employer, Scott Paper Company, for “unlawful racial discrim-
ination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 . . . and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.”43  At the
district court level, the employer won on the unlawful discrimination
count and the employee won on the retaliation claim.44  From 1970,
when Woodson started working for the company, until 1988, Woodson
received many promotions.45  However, beginning in 1988, Woodson
was denied for several product system leader positions.46  At this
point, Woodson filed racial discrimination charges against his em-
ployer.47  In 1990, Scott Paper Company gave Woodson one of three
product system leader positions, but the division he was in charge of
“was the smallest and worst performing.”48  When Woodson was
awarded this position, a supervisor told him that he should now focus
his attention on this new position.49  Scott Paper Co. implemented a
“forced ranking” system of all company employees pursuant to a reor-
ganization and cost reduction program in 1991.50  Woodson was
ranked number twenty-five; subsequently, the bottom five employees
were terminated, one of which was Woodson.51  In this case, determi-
native effect was used.52  The appellate court agreed that “Third Cir-
cuit precedent required a district court to instruct the jury that it can
hold a defendant liable only if the prohibited activity had a determina-
tive effect on the decision to terminate the plaintiff.”53  As a result,
the appellate court held that the district court had “abused its discre-
tion in failing to instruct the jury that improper motive must have had
a determinative effect on the decision to fire Woodson.”54
E. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp.
In this case, Susan Lewis brought suit under Title I of the ADA,
prohibiting “discrimination ‘because of’ the disability of an em-
ployee.”55  When presenting the claim to the jury, each party wanted
the standard to be different: the employer wanted the jury to be in-
structed that the employee “could only prevail if the company’s deci-
43. Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 916 (3d Cir. 1997).
44. Id.





50. Id. at 918.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 932.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 935.
55. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 313 (6th Cir. 2012).
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sion to fire her was ‘sole[ly]’ because of Lewis’s disability, a term that
appears in the Rehabilitation Act but not in the ADA”; and the em-
ployee argued that she “could prevail if her disability was ‘a motivat-
ing factor’ in the company’s employment action, a phrase that appears
in Title VII but not in the ADA.”56  Lewis was a registered nurse at
one of Humboldt Acquisition Corporation’s retirement homes.57
Lewis was dismissed from work in March of 2006 and sued in 2007
under the ADA, claiming that she was fired “because she had a medi-
cal condition that made it difficult for her to walk and that occasion-
ally required her to use a wheelchair.”58  The court had long applied
the “solely” standard for both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act
because of the similar language, but over time, it has become clear
that “solely” is not a part of the ADA standard.59  In addition, the
court could not incorporate “‘a motivating factor’ from Title VII into
the ADA” for the same reasons.60  Both the ADEA and the ADA
“bar discrimination ‘because of’ an employee’s age or disability,
meaning that they prohibit discrimination that is a ‘but-for’ cause of
the employer’s adverse decision.”61  On appeal, the Sixth Circuit re-
versed the district court’s decision and ruled in favor of Lewis and
asserted that the but-for standard appears to be articulated by the
statute and not a sole-cause standard.62
F. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa
In Costa,63 Catharina Costa filed suit against the Las Vegas Hotel
and Casino alleging sex discrimination and harassment under Title VII
due to a male co-worker being given a five-day suspension for an al-
tercation with her—whereas she was terminated.64  The harassment
allegation was dismissed by the trial court, but the discrimination alle-
gation was allowed to proceed to trial under the premise that Costa
was disciplined more harshly than her male counterparts for the same
conduct.65  The district court gave the jury a mixed-motive instruc-
tion.66  However, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit “vacated and re-
manded, holding that the District Court had erred in giving the mixed-
motive instruction because respondent had failed to present ‘substan-
tial evidence of conduct or statements by the employer directly re-
56. Id. at 314.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 315–17.
60. Id. at 317.
61. Id. at 321.
62. Id. at 321–22.
63. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
64. Id. at 95–96.
65. Id. at 96.
66. Id.
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flecting discriminatory animus.’”67  The Supreme Court considered
the issue and noted that Title VII was silent with respect to the type of
evidence required in mixed-motive cases.68  As such, the Court ruled
that mixed-motive plaintiffs must only present sufficient evidence for
a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor for the adverse
employment action taken.69 As the Desert Palace case states it:  “In
order to avail itself of the affirmative defense, the employer must
‘demonstrate that [it] would have taken the same action in the ab-
sence of the impermissible motivating factor.’”70  In addition, Desert
Palace held that circumstantial evidence was sufficient in mixed-mo-
tive cases and that direct evidence of discrimination was not
necessary.71
G. Head v. Glacier Northwest, Inc.
Matthew Head worked for Glacier Northwest, Inc. as a barge of-
floader.72  Early in 2001, Head was diagnosed with either depression
or bipolar disorder and missed two months of work by means of a
Family Medical Leave of Absence because of this disability.73  When
returning to work in May 2001, Head was restricted to working the
day shift with limitations on the number of hours he could work per
day and each week.74  In June 2001, Head was fired after getting a
loader stuck in the mud.75  Head filed discrimination claims and retali-
ation claims under both the ADA and Oregon state statutes.76  At the
district court level, the jury’s verdict was in favor of Glacier, the em-
ployer.77  However, single-motive, because-of jury instructions were
given.78
On appeal, the court discussed two alternatives proposed in Costa.79
The first alternative stated the following:
[I]f the judge determines that the only reasonable conclusion the
jury could reach is that discriminatory animus is the sole reason for
the challenged action or that discrimination played no role in the
decision, the jury should be instructed to determine whether the
challenged action was taken “because of” the prohibited reason.80
67. Id. at 97.
68. Id. at 99.
69. Id. at 101.
70. Id. at 94–95.
71. Id. at 101.





77. Id. at 1058.
78. Id. at 1057.
79. Id. at 1065–66.
80. Id. at 1066.
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The second alternative stated the following:
[This alternative] applies in a case in which the evidence could sup-
port a finding that discrimination is one of two or more reasons for
the challenged decision, at least one of which may be legitimate.  In
that case the jury should be instructed to determine whether the
discriminatory reason was “a motivating factor” in the challenged
action.81
The appellate court determined that the second standard, rather
than the first, should have been applied in this case.82  Therefore, the
court adopted “a ‘motivating factor’ standard for causation in the
ADA context.”83  In terms of the discrimination claims, the court
stated that Head could have been fired “because he violated the
equipment policy, because Glacier perceived him as being disabled, or
because of some combination.”84  In terms of the retaliation claims,
Head could have been fired “because he violated the equipment pol-
icy, because he requested a reasonable accommodation, or because of
some combination of the two.”85
H. White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.
In White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,86 Todd White alleged that su-
pervisor Tim Phillips harbored discriminatory animus towards Afri-
can-Americans and made several comments about no one wanting to
be around a black man, circulated emails that appeared to be racial in
nature, and referred to a sales representative as “that black girl” in-
stead of by her actual name.87  He subsequently was bypassed for a
promotion, received a deficient performance evaluation, and received
a lower raise than anticipated.88  These events prompted him to file a
charge with the EEOC and, after receiving his Right-To-Sue letter,
file a lawsuit.89  The district court dismissed the case on summary
judgment.90  The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding91 that
in order to defeat summary judgment plaintiffs merely must produce
evidence (1) of an adverse employment action, and (2) that a pro-
tected characteristic under Title VII was a motivating factor for the
adverse action.92  The White Court further stated that a plaintiff can
defeat summary judgment “simply by showing that the defendant’s
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1067.
84. Id. at 1066.
85. Id.
86. White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008).
87. Id. at 385.
88. Id. at 387–89.
89. Id. at 389.
90. Id. at 384.
91. Id. at 406.
92. Id. at 400, 406.
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consideration of a protected characteristic ‘was a motivating factor for
any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice.’”93  The court indicated that this new burden at the summary
judgment stage is “not onerous” and should keep a case from trial
“only where the record is devoid of evidence” supporting the plain-
tiff’s claim.94 The court also stated that it is “irrelevant” whether the
plaintiff presents direct or circumstantial evidence supporting the
claim, and that direct evidence of discrimination is not required for a
plaintiff to obtain a mixed-motive jury instruction under Title VII.95
I. Schott v. Care Initiatives
Donna Schott worked as an administrator of a nursing home in
Kingsley, Iowa.96  Schott alleged claims of age discrimination in viola-
tion of an Iowa statute as well as the ADEA.97  The court addresses in
this case that the state standards and federal standards may be differ-
ent.98  Care Initiatives filed for summary judgment on Schott’s claims
but the court denied the motion on both the federal and state claims.99
The court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis on
both the state and federal age discrimination claims because both
were based on circumstantial evidence.100  The court, using a but-for
standard, found that Schott established a prima facie case of age dis-
crimination (terminated and replaced by someone younger).101  In ad-
dition, Care Initiatives gave “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
for its decision to terminate her.”102  However, Schott prevailed be-
cause she “generated genuine issues of material fact on the ‘pretext’
issue.”103
J. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White
Plaintiff Sheila White brought a sexual harassment and retaliation
allegation against her employer due to her being reassigned from her
position as a forklift driver after complaining that her supervisor was
treating her in a disparate manner due to her sex.104  After filing an
EEOC charge, she was suspended without pay.105  Burlington later
determined the suspension was unwarranted and provided her with
93. Id. at 401 (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 400.
95. Id. (citing Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003)).
96. Schott v. Care Initiatives, 662 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1116 (N.D. Iowa 2009).
97. Id.





103. Id. at 1121.
104. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006).
105. Id.
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back pay.106  Ms. White, however, filed an additional retaliation
charge, and eventually filed suit on the bases that: (1) changing her
job responsibilities, and (2) suspending her for thirty-seven days with-
out pay amounted to unlawful retaliation in violation of Title VII.107
The Supreme Court, affirming the judgment of the Sixth Circuit in Ms.
White’s favor on both retaliation counts, held that a plaintiff’s burden
of establishing a materially adverse employment action is less onerous
in the retaliation context than in the anti-discrimination context.108  A
materially adverse employment action in the retaliation context con-
sists of any action that “well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’”109
This more liberal definition permits actions not materially adverse for
purposes of an anti-discrimination claim to qualify as such in the retal-
iation context.110
K. University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar
Dr. Naiel Nassar was a faculty member at the Southwestern Medi-
cal Center and also a staff physician at Parkland Memorial Hospi-
tal.111  The hospital and the university had an agreement that required
the hospital to offer vacant staff physician positions to university
faculty members.112  Dr. Nassar made a claim that his supervisor, Dr.
Levine, was biased against him despite her being involved in a promo-
tional opportunity for him.113  His complaint stemmed from several
alleged comments she made, including a statement that “Middle Eas-
terners are lazy.”114  Dr. Nassar, of Middle Eastern descent, com-
plained to Levine’s supervisor, Dr. Fitz, about feeling discriminated
against.115  Afterwards he entered into negotiations with the hospital,
offering to remain on as a physician but resign from the university.116
When the hospital seemed willing to accept this proposal, he issued a
resignation letter to the university wherein he stated that he was re-
signing due to Dr. Levine’s harassment and discrimination.117  Upset
by this public embarrassment to Dr. Levine, Dr. Fitz objected to the
hospital hiring Dr. Nassar.118   When the hospital rescinded its offer,
106. Id.
107. Id. at 59.
108. Id. at 68.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 69 (noting that a supervisor’s failure to invite an employee to lunch
could, under certain circumstances, amount to materially adverse retaliation action).






117. Id. at 2524.
118. Id.
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Dr. Nassar eventually filed suit under Title VII alleging race discrimi-
nation and retaliation.119
Following receipt of a mixed-motive instruction, the jury found for
the plaintiff on both counts.120  On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the
court vacated the constructive discharge racial discrimination allega-
tion but affirmed the retaliation verdict, stating that “retaliation
claims brought under § 2000e-3(a)—like claims of status-based dis-
crimination under § 2000e-2(a)—require only a showing that retalia-
tion was a motivating factor for the adverse employment action rather
than its but-for cause.”121  Certiorari was granted to assess the proper
motivating-factor standard for retaliation cases.122
The Court first looked at the traditional view of tort claims, pursu-
ant to the Restatement of Torts, and the prevalent view that there
must be proof that the defendant’s conduct did in fact cause the plain-
tiff’s injury (but-for analysis).123  The Court presumed that this back-
ground was representative of Congress’ intent absent an indication in
the statute to the contrary.124  The Court then acknowledged that the
1991 amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was intended to cod-
ify the burden-shifting and lessened-causation framework (allowing a
mixed-motive instead of a but-for, motivating-factor standard) of the
Price Waterhouse case while eliminating the ability for the employer
to defeat liability by showing that it would have made the termination
decision based solely upon the legitimate termination reason.125  In-
stead, the statute allowed the employer to be able to reduce its liabil-
ity to the employee with such evidence, and if deemed liable would
only have to provide the plaintiff with declaratory and injunctive relief
and attorney fees and costs but not monetary damages and a reinstate-
ment order.126  However, the Court noted that Title VII’s anti-retalia-
tion provision is set forth in a different section of the Act than its
status-based discrimination provision(s).127  In the anti-retaliation sec-
tion, it used the term “because” in describing the protection af-
forded.128  In particular, it states in relevant part that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to dis-
criminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed




122. Id. It should be noted that the Fifth Circuit subsequently reversed course and
determined that the mixed-motive standard that applies to status-based discrimina-
tion claims does not apply to retaliation claims. See, e.g., Carter v. Luminant Power
Servs. Co., 714 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 2013).
123. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2524–25.
124. Id. at 2525.
125. Id. at 2526.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2528.
128. Id.
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chapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or par-
ticipated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under this subchapter.129
The Court went to great lengths to compare this provision to the
ADEA statute at issue in the Gross case because both use the “be-
cause” terminology in explaining the criteria relevant to the protec-
tion.130  The Court indicated that if Congress intended to make the
same motivating-factor standard apply to all Title VII claims, it could
have done so.131  Instead, Congress limited the mixed-motive standard
to just five of the seven protected categories under the Act, namely
those articulated in § 2000e-2, where particularly it states that:
[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the com-
plaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice.132
The Court was of the opinion that if Congress intended for retalia-
tion—by way of either the employee’s direct opposition to employ-
ment discrimination or the employee’s submission of or support for a
complaint that alleges employment discrimination—to be included
within this standard, it would have simply indicated as such.133  In va-
cating the decision of the Fifth Circuit and remanding it back for fur-
ther proceedings, the Court also stressed its concern that allowing a
lessened standard for retaliation claims would greatly burden employ-
ers and the court system due to the fact that retaliation claims filed
with the EEOC has nearly doubled in the past fifteen years—from
just over 16,000 in 1997 to over 31,000 in 2012—and that these retalia-
tion claims are now the largest category of claims filed with the EEOC
except for race discrimination.134  Because the Fifth Circuit has re-
versed course and has already issued a ruling consistent with the
Court’s opinion that retaliation claims are only entitled to a but-for or
because-of analysis, it is a certainty that Nassar’s victory will now be
vacated in full.
III. ANALYSIS
Perhaps most concerning with the Court’s decision in Nassar is the
discussion regarding the rise in retaliation claims.  The Court seems
129. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006)).
130. Id. at 2528–31.
131. See id. at 2530.
132. Id. at 2526 (quoting U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(m) (LexisNexis 2013)).
133. Id. at 2528, 2532.
134. Id. at 2531; Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2012, EEOC, http://www.
eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited June 20, 2013) (showing
that in 2000 to 2011, retaliation filings increased from 19,694 to 37,334 (a 90% in-
crease), while EEOC filings generally increased from 77,444 to 99,947 (a 29%
increase)).
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bothered by the notion that a lessening of the causation standard for
retaliation claims could “contribute to the filing of frivolous claims,
which would siphon resources from the efforts by employer[s], admin-
istrative agencies, and the courts [trying] to combat workplace harass-
ment.”135  The Court then provides a scenario where, if a lessened
causation standard applies, an employee brings both an unfounded
discrimination and retaliation claim and details how an employer
might be able to escape going to trial on the discrimination claim yet
still be subjected to a trial on the retaliation action.136
In essence, the Court seems to support the notion that, not only are
retaliation claims generally easier to prove, adding a lessened mixed-
motive standard would lead to retaliation cases surviving summary
judgment at a ratio much greater than status-based discrimination
cases.  One need only look at the Court’s statement in the Burlington
Northern case—that a plaintiff’s burden of establishing a materially
adverse employment action is less onerous in the retaliation context
than in the anti-discrimination context—to see why the Court feels
this way.137  But is this a justifiable reason for adding a larger hurdle
for retaliation claims?  Is this decision allowing employers to retaliate
against those that protest discrimination while giving the employer lit-
tle fear of reprisal?  If this is the case, why would anyone try to oppose
discrimination?  And with less whistleblowers, there will be less dis-
crimination claims with witnesses readily available to support the
claims and, as such, a higher number of cases dismissed on summary
judgment.  Perhaps that is the motive!
Before discussing the various motivating-factor standards in more
depth and analyzing how to simplify the approach, it is somewhat in-
structive to first consider the very astutely drafted dissent of Justice
Ginsburg in the Nassar case.
A. The Dissent
First citing to the Burlington decision, Justice Ginsburg, joined in
her dissent by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, points to the
Court’s recognition that effective protection against retaliation is es-
sential to providing effective protection against workplace discrimina-
tion.138  Indeed, fear of retaliation is why people stay silent and do not
report discrimination or support co-workers in their pursuit of a rem-
135. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2531–32.
136. Id. at 2532.
137. See Barnett Brooks, Gail Farb & Mandi Ballard, The Future of Retaliation
Claims, SHRM HR MAGAZINE (January 2011), available at http://www.shrm.org/pub-
lications/hrmagazine/editorialcontent/2011/0111/pages/0111ballard.aspx.  In this arti-
cle, the authors argue that the Burlington case would open the floodgate to retaliation
claims and lawsuits, pointing to the drastic increase in EEOC retaliation charge filings
and subsequent lawsuits filed. Id.
138. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534, (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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edy for discrimination they might be experiencing.139  She also notes
that historically the ban on discrimination and the ban on retaliation
have travelled together; Title VII complainants tend to raise both pro-
visions of the Act in tandem.140  As such, she posits that reigning in
retaliation claims by making them meet a stricter standard than dis-
crimination claims certainly was not Congress’ intent in amending Ti-
tle VII in 1991.141  But, this is exactly what the Court does in seizing
upon § 2000e-2(m)—adopted by Congress in an attempt to strengthen
Title VII—and turning it into a measure to reduce the force of retalia-
tion claims.142
Of note, Justice Ginsburg points to the Court’s statements that Con-
gress made no assertion relative to an intent to include retaliation in
the amended mixed-motive standard articulated in the § 2000e-2(m);
however, the Court neglects to look at the House Report, particularly
Part II, which does elude to such an intent.143  The Court was not per-
suaded by the EEOC’s interpretation of § 2000e-2(m)—an interpreta-
tion that considered retaliation claims to be within § 2000e-2(m)—
because the Court determined that this interpretation suffered from a
lack of depth. In response, Justice Ginsburg pointed to EEOC discus-
sion that, she argued, clearly showed how and why the EEOC reached
the conclusion that it did, which was that Congress intended retalia-
tion and discrimination claims to share the same mixed-motived stan-
dard.144 The Court, as its precedence in Skidmore dictates, should
have afforded deference to the interpretation of the statute in the
EEOC’s compliance manual and internal directives.145  In fact, until
this very ruling, the Court had been very clear that retaliation is actu-
ally a manifestation of status-based discrimination, and the Jackson
case explained that “retaliation is discrimination ‘on the basis of sex’
because it is an intentional response to the nature of the complaint:
an allegation of sex discrimination.”146  In the Title IX case Jackson,
as well as the ADEA case Gomez-Perez v. Potter, the Court actually
read retaliation into the statute even though it was silent on the sub-
139. Id. at 2534–35.
140. Id. at 2535.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2539.
144. Id. at 2545.  The EEOC discussed how the Third Circuit discussed, although
did not hold, that in enacting § 2000e-2(m) Congress knew that courts tended to bor-
row from discrimination law in determining the burdens and order of proof in retalia-
tion cases.  Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 934 (3d Cir. 1997). It was
plausible that Congress expected the same practice to continue. Id.  Although the
Third Circuit did not subscribe to this theory in its ultimate decision, the EEOC found
this logic sound and subscribed to it in its Compliance Manual, at 614:0008, n.45. Id.
145. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2540; see also Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552
U.S. 389, 399 (2008); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
146. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2537; see also Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544
U.S. 167, 174 (2005).
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ject.147  In a complete reverse of course, the Court is now reading re-
taliation unfavorably when the statute seems to suggest otherwise.
Most unfortunate about the Nassar decision is that the Court seems
to interpret the law in a manner to get the end result it seeks.  The
dissent discusses how the Court took great pains in its decision in
Gross to distinguish the ADEA from Title VII and to state that uni-
form interpretation of two statutes is sometimes unwarranted; yet, the
Court freely borrows because-of language from Gross to reach the
end result it desires in the case at bar.148 So, the employer prevailed in
Gross because, according to the Court, the ADEA’s anti-discrimina-
tion prescription is not like Title VII’s, but the employer prevails
again in Nassar because there is no textual difference between the
ADEA’s use of “because” and the use of the same word in Title VII’s
retaliation provision.149  When this Author was in law school, one of
his professors quipped that courts tend to decide how they want the
case to resolve and then merely conjure up an opinion that supports
that decision.  Perhaps it is the “tail wags the dog” phenomenon: the
concern about a rise in retaliation claims and employee-friendly retali-
ation decisions is trumping a larger issue of the proper interpretation
of Title VII in relation to these claims.  As Justice Ginsburg states,
“What sense can one make of this other than ‘heads the employer
wins, tails the employee loses?’”150
B. The EEOC Perspective
As noted in the Nassar dissenting opinion, the EEOC has taken the
position that the standard applicable to retaliation cases should mirror
that given to discrimination cases.  Specifically, the EEOC Compli-
ance Manual states the following:
E.   PROOF OF CAUSAL CONNECTION
In order to establish unlawful retaliation, there must be proof that
the respondent took an adverse action because the charging party
engaged in protected activity.  Proof of this retaliatory motive can
be through direct or circumstantial evidence.  The evidentiary
framework that applies to other types of discrimination claims also
applies to retaliation claims.151
This statement clearly shows the EEOC’s expectation that retaliation
claims within a statute will be treated identically to how discrimina-
147. See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 174; see also Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1951
(2008) (holding that federal employees can sue for retaliation under the ADEA, even
though the ADEA only expressly authorizes a retaliation claim in private-sector
actions).
148. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2544–45 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Gross v. FBL
Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174–76 (2009).
149. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2544–45 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
150. Id.
151. EEOC Compl. Man. § 8(E) (1998), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/
docs/retal.html.
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tion claims are treated.  This expectation is logical, of course, because
having various standards would result in confusion within the statute
and within court cases where a plaintiff attempts to litigate both dis-
crimination and retaliation claims.  The Court recognizes this expecta-
tion when it applies the identical standard to ADA and ADEA
discrimination and retaliation claims, yet the Court ignores this basic
principle when looking at Title VII claims—no doubt in an attempt to
curb the influx of retaliation cases that have grown exponentially in
the past decade.152
To underscore this rise in successful retaliation claims concern, in
February 2013, the EEOC won a $675,000 retaliation verdict against
RadioShack but was unsuccessful in the discrimination allegation
against the employer.153  This type of case has been a common theme
in recent years and has even led plaintiff attorneys to encourage em-
ployees to bring retaliation claims, not discrimination claims, because
they are (or were before the Nassar decision) easier to win.154  A re-
view of this statement listed on Attorney Glenn McGovern’s website
describes the common sentiment:
5. Choose a case where there is employer retaliation.
Juries hate employers who retaliate against people who testify for
others in a discrimination investigation or who report sexual harass-
ment or discrimination. Retaliation violates the Golden Rule. In-
stead of a 55%-65% statistical chance of success with a sexual
harassment claim or racial discrimination claim there is a 98% per
cent [sic] chance of success in an employment retaliation case. This
is based on Jury Verdict Research studies. It is actually easier to win
a retaliation case then [sic] a racial discrimination case. You can
have a very weak discrimination case and a very strong retaliation
case that will save the day.155
With this type of blatant advertising, and insurance companies that
provide EPL (employment practices liability) insurance to employers
sounding the alarm,156 it is no wonder that the Court became con-
152. See EEOC Wins Second Victory Against RadioShack in Retaliation Case,
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.eeoc.
gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/2-28-13a.cfm (stating that in fiscal year 2012, the EEOC
received 37,836 charges alleging retaliation).  This constituted 38.1% of the total num-
ber of charges, the highest percentage for retaliation charges in history, and the larg-
est number of any basis for a discrimination charge. Id.
153. Id.; see EEOC v. RadioShack Corp., Civil No. 10–cv–02365–LTB–BNB, 2012
WL 6090283 (D. Colo. Dec. 6, 2012).
154. See Glenn C. McGovern, My Top 10 Ways to Win an Employment Case,
GLENNMCGOVERN.COM, http://www.glennmcgovern.com/CM/Custom/My-Top-10-
Ways-To-Win-An-Employment-Case.asp (last visited July 9, 2013).
155. Id.
156. Art Seifert, EPL Business Battles Retaliation Claims Boom, THE ROUGH
NOTES COMPANY (June 2012), available at http://roughnotes.com/rnmagazine/2012/
june2012/2012_06p016.htm. The article points out that:
• According to data from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC), retaliation claims have increased 100% from 1992 to 2006;
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cerned.  However, making it more difficult to succeed in retaliation
cases is not the answer.  After all, it is not uncommon for a human
being to seek revenge against someone who brings an allegation
against them, regardless of the allegation’s truth or veracity.  If the
allegation is untrue, the discrimination case should lose.  But should
people be able to retaliate at will with the knowledge that succeeding
in a retaliation allegation is even more challenging than proving dis-
crimination?  This certainly seems to be against the spirit of the stat-
ute, as well as Congressional and EEOC intent.
Consider the 2001 case of Celia Zimmerman, where the First Circuit
Court upheld a $740,000 verdict against the employer and the em-
ployee’s supervisor.157  Ms. Zimmerman was a high-ranking and fast-
rising employee with the company until she informed her manager
that she was pregnant and subsequently needed time off work due to
the pregnancy.158  Her manager moved her to a smaller office, re-
moved her from high-profile meetings and projects, strategically tried
to turn her co-workers against her, and began giving her declining per-
formance evaluations.159  Eventually, she was taken off of work due to
severe depressive disorder.160  While the court found no evidence of
discrimination on the basis of sex or pregnancy, it did find that the
company and its manager were guilty of retaliatory conduct and tortu-
ous interference with employment relationships.161
Turning to modern-day cases, clear evidence of retaliation will be
excessively difficult to prove, and retaliation cases like Zimmerman’s
will likely prove unsuccessful in light of the increased motivating-fac-
tor standard now proffered by the Nassar decision.
C. The Standards
The following subsections will serve as a summary of the motivat-
ing-factors information provided above.  Based on the information
above, there are essentially three different standards that have been
used with various employment discrimination statutes.  However, note
that the third standard has utilized various terms to essentially state
the same premise: that discrimination and/or retaliation must be “the”
• In 2008, claims involving retaliation rose 23% to 32,690 claims, while non-
retaliation claims rose 12% in the same period;
• A record number of retaliation claims were filed with the EEOC in 2010,
about 50% more than in 2000; and
• Retaliation claims represent over 30% of all discrimination claims filed
with the EEOC.
Id.
157. Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 72 (1st Cir. 2001).
158. Id. at 73.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 74.
161. Id. at 75.
74 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1
cause or motivating-factor for the treatment received.  These three
standards are as follows:
(1) The burden-shifting and pretext standard;
(2) The mixed-motive standard; and
(3) The but-for, because-of, or sole-cause standard.
1. Title VII
In Title VII cases, it should be noted that McDonnell Douglas has
never been overruled and remains widely utilized.  Because many em-
ployment suits get dismissed at the motion for summary judgment
stage and circuit courts have utilized varying approaches to looking at
these cases when a Rule 56162 summary judgment motion is pending,
plaintiffs need to determine and clearly articulate whether they will be
pursuing their claims against the employer based upon a McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework or based upon a mixed-motive
motivating-factor framework (bringing the Act’s 1991 amendment
into focus).163
a. Civil Rights Act of 1964: Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
(mixed-motive cases)
Price Waterhouse defines the following standard for mixed-motive
cases:
[W]hen a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her gender played
a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may
avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that it would have made the same decision if it had not
taken the plaintiff’s gender into account.164
b. Civil Rights Act of 1991 (Amended Civil Rights Act of 1964):
Two new standards in mixed-motive cases
The first new standard states the following:
[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the com-
plaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice.165
The second new standard states the following:
162. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
163. Christopher J. Emden, Subverting Rule 56? McDonnell Douglas, White v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., and the Mess of Summary Judgment in Mixed-Motive Cases,
1 WM. & MARY L. REV. 139, 153–56 (2010).
164. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989).
165. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(m) (LexisNexis 2013); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539
U.S. 90, 94 (2003).
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[T]he employer has a limited affirmative defense that does not ab-
solve it, but restricts the remedies available to a plaintiff.166
In summary, the first standard establishes the unlawful employment
practice.  The second standard requires that an employer show the
same action would have occurred even without the “impermissible
motivating factor” if the employer wants to assert the affirmative
defense.167
c. Pretext Case: McDonnell Douglas v. Green
Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the
plaintiff has to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination
under Title VII, by showing:
(i) [T]hat he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking appli-
cants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv)
that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the em-
ployer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s
qualifications.168
Then, the burden shifts to the employer, who must “articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.”169
Next, the employee must “be afforded a fair opportunity to show that
[employer’s] stated reason for [employee’s] rejection was in fact pre-
text.”170  Ultimately, the employee has to be able to show that “the
presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a cover-up
for a racially discriminatory decision.”171
2. The ADA and the ADEA
The ADA and the ADEA possess the same motivating-factor stan-
dard.172  Despite what the Ninth Circuit decided in Head, the disabil-
ity discrimination case discussed earlier, plaintiffs must currently show
that age or disability is a “‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse
decision” under both the ADA and the ADEA.173 Either direct or
circumstantial evidence may be used to prove but-for causation by a
preponderance of the evidence.174  In addition, the burden does not
shift to the employer to show that the same action would have been
taken despite age or disability.175
166. Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 94.
167. Id. at 94–95.
168. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 804.
171. Id. at 805.
172. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 321 (6th Cir. 2012).
173. Id.; Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009).
174. Gross, 557 U.S. at 177–78.
175. Id. at 179.
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Specifically, the ADEA utilizes the because-of language, which has
been deemed to require a tort-based, but-for analysis.  The statute
states that:
(a) Employer practices
It shall be unlawful for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or other-
wise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual’s age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment op-
portunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual’s age . . . .176
Similarly, the ADA provides that:
(a) General rule
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual
on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compen-
sation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.
(b) Construction
As used in subsection (a) of this section, the term “discriminate
against a qualified individual on the basis of disability” includes—
(1) limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee
in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such
applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or
employee . . . .177
3. Rehabilitation Act
Although only briefly mentioned in this Article, the Rehabilitation
Act uses the more difficult sole-cause standard.178  The analysis of
claims under the ADA roughly parallels those brought under the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973.179  However, the standard of proof under
each are currently different.180  This is odd considering the fact that
the Rehabilitation Act specifically provides that:
176. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012) (emphasis added).
177. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012) (emphasis added).
178. Lewis, 681 F.3d at 313–14.
179. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1995); see also Maddox v. Univ. of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843, 846
n.2 (6th Cir. 1995), abrogated by Lewis, 681 F.3d at 312.
180. Note that the Gross holding stands for the proposition that a plaintiff must
prove that his or her age was the determining factor of the adverse action, not the
“sole cause” of the adverse action and not a “motivating factor” in the adverse action.
Gross, 557 U.S. at 174.  This suggests that the more difficult standard to meet is the
sole-cause standard. See R. Scott Oswald, ADEA Claims in the Wake of Gross v. FBL
Financial Services Inc., CORPORATE COUNSEL (Jan. 9, 2013),  http://www.law.com/cor-
poratecounsel/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202583743012&ADEA_Claims_in_the_Wake_
of_Gross_v_FBL_Financial_Services_Inc#ixzz2YNdNgZXU.
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(g) Standards used in determining violation of section:
The standards used to determine whether this section has been vio-
lated in a complaint alleging non-affirmative action employment
discrimination under this section shall be the standards applied
under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42
U.S.C. 12111 et seq.) and the provisions of sections 501 through 504,
and 510, of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C.
12201–12204 and 12210), as such sections relate to employment.181
4. Retaliation
The prima facie elements of retaliation in Title VII claims are simi-
lar but distinct from those of a discrimination claim.  The elements
are:
(1) She engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) this exercise
of protected rights was known to defendant; (3) defendant thereaf-
ter took adverse employment action against the plaintiff, or the
plaintiff was subjected to severe or pervasive retaliatory harassment
by a supervisor; and (4) there was a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action or
harassment.182
As noted above in the Burlington Northern case, the Supreme Court
held that a plaintiff’s burden of establishing a materially adverse em-
ployment action is less onerous in the retaliation context than in the
anti-discrimination context.183  However, it has seemingly become
more onerous following the Nassar decision.
The retaliation claims in ADA and ADEA cases have the same
standards, both the but-for standard and the because-of standard, that
are found in discrimination claims under those statutes.  As this Arti-
cle states, the only statute that now curiously has a separate discrimi-
nation and retaliation standard is Title VII, courtesy of the Nassar
decision.
IV. PROPOSING A UNIFIED MOTIVATING-FACTOR STANDARD
Although the language in these statutes is often confused, the dif-
ferent portions seem to mirror one another more than expected.
Based on, essentially, the three standards listed above, it is not diffi-
cult to eliminate one of these standards from being part of a more all-
encompassing motivating-factor standard. When the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 was enacted, it amended the because-of standard in Title VII
to become more similar to a motivating-factor standard.  The standard
in Title VII can also be deemed a mixed-motive standard due to the
employer’s ability to limit its liability substantially if it can show that it
181. 29 U.S.C. § 791 (2012).
182. Morris v. Oldham Cnty. Fiscal Ct., 201 F.3d 784, 792 (6th Cir. 2000).
183. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 66 (2006).
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would have made the same decision due to a co-existent legitimate
reason for the adverse employment action.  The sole-cause standard
from the Rehabilitation Act should not be considered because it is an
outlier, it is the most narrowly defined and difficult to meet, and it
does not relate to any other standard mentioned in any meaningful
way.
Additionally, while the burden-shifting approach in McDonnell
Douglas has stood the test of time for forty years, its current applica-
tion is causing confusion among the circuits.  Courts are essentially
confused as to whether they should be looking at a mixed-motive bur-
den-shifting approach or a single-motive burden-shifting approach
when deciding whether a case should survive summary judgment.
However, with clarity in the approach, the dilemma can be minimized
if not removed altogether. McDonnell Douglas is still relevant for its
articulation of the prima facie case, but, by using the standard articu-
lated in the Act’s 1991 amendment, the burden-shifting approach
should be clarified to reflect the employer’s need to articulate the
mixed-motive standard for the purposes of reducing liability, as op-
posed to the employer needing to articulate a legitimate, non-discrimi-
natory reason for its decision (the current test) in order to fully defeat
liability.   Lastly, if the employee can prove that the proffered reason
of the employer is pretext, a lie, this should serve to defeat the em-
ployer’s ability to limit its liability and re-open the full panacea of
remedies that the statute provides for the plaintiff/employee.
While the ADA and ADEA still regularly and rightfully utilize Mc-
Donnell Douglas in tandem with the but-for/because-of standard, it
would be more logical for all of the similarly situated employment
discrimination statutes to follow a similar path.  As such, the standard
from Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA (and arguably the Rehabili-
tation Act as well) should all be incorporated into one standard.  The
most logical standard is the one most recently articulated by Congress
in Title VII: the “a” motivating-factor standard coupled with the
mixed-motive analysis.  However, one could legitimately argue that a
but-for— “the” motivating-factor standard—should apply to all of the
discrimination and retaliation statutes, thus mirroring it after the
ADEA and ADA.  In the end, consistency is more important to this
Author than deciding which motivating-factor standard should ulti-
mately control the statutes.
For the purposes of developing a proposed standard, the more lib-
eral standard articulated in Title VII will be considered.  The reason
for using this standard is because it would serve as a greater deterrent
to discriminatory and retaliatory animus in the workplace.  The pro-
posed standard that seems to mesh all of these standards together will
consist of four parts.
The first part uses the first step of the McDonnell Douglas standard:
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.  The first part of the
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McDonnell Douglas standard seems ambiguous enough to incorporate
both the “a motivating factor” in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the
but-for causation of the ADA and ADEA standards.  It would be wise
for Congress to articulate a clear test that states that the but-for test is
no longer applicable to any employment discrimination or retaliation
cases.
For the second part of the proposed standard, the second standard
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the second part of the McDonnell
Douglas standard can be combined.  Essentially, both of these por-
tions of the standards give the employer an opportunity to respond.
As in McDonnell Douglas, the burden should shift to the employer at
this point.184  The employer can provide “legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory” reasons185 for rejecting the employee, which would have re-
sulted in the same way had the discriminatory purpose not been
considered at all.186  As in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, this is the
employer’s limited affirmative defense: it may possess the ability to
limit the liability that will be imposed through clearly articulating the
mixed-motive.187
The third part should be taken from the third part of the McDonnell
Douglas standard, allowing the employee/complainant/plaintiff the
opportunity to show that the reasons provided by the employer are
only there to “cover-up for a [ ] discriminatory decision.”188  This
could bring out the real reasons for discrimination, such as not want-
ing to provide a reasonable accommodation.  In addition, it could give
the employee/complainant/plaintiff the opportunity to show why dam-
ages against the employer should not be limited.189
Lastly, the fourth part should incorporate retaliation into the stan-
dard so that it is clear that discrimination and retaliation should be
treated identically in the enforcement of these statutes.  This proposed
standard should be implemented into Title VII as well as the ADA,
ADEA, and the Rehabilitation Act.  An example of this new Motivat-
ing-Factor Standard is as follows:
Motivating-Factor Standard
1. Employee/Complainant/Plaintiff has the initial burden of estab-
lishing a prima facie case of discrimination by showing:
a. That employee belongs to a protected class;
b. That employee applied and was qualified for the job and/or
was presently working in a job and was treated differently
than someone not a member of the protected class;
184. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
185. Id.
186. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94–95 (2003).
187. Id.
188. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805.
189. See Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 94 (explaining methods of limiting
damages).
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c. Despite employee’s qualifications, employee was rejected/
terminated and/or otherwise suffered an adverse employ-
ment action due in whole or in part to the employee’s being
a member of the protected class; and
d. After being rejected/terminated, and/or suffering the ad-
verse employment action, the position remained open and
employer continued to seek applicants from persons who
possessed the same qualifications as employee and/or a per-
son not in the protected class received more favorable
treatment.190
2. The burden then shifts to the employer for the purpose of the
employer asserting a limited affirmative defense.191  The follow-
ing should be included in the defense:
a. The employer provides legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son(s) for rejecting/terminating the employee and/or ad-
versely impacting the employee’s employment, which show
that the same result would have occurred without the con-
sideration of the protected class/discriminatory factor;
and192
b. The employer shows that the remedies given to the plaintiff
should be limited.193
3. Employee/Complainant/Plaintiff is then given an opportunity to
show that the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
for rejecting/terminating the employee/complainant/plaintiff
were “pretext”194 or “cover-up for a [ ] discriminatory deci-
sion.”195  Employee/Complainant/Plaintiff can rebut any of em-
ployer’s reasons for limiting his or her remedies and, if rebutted
by a preponderance of the evidence, the remedies will not be
limited.196
4. The same showing of “a motivating-factor” for the employer’s
treatment of the employee is applicable to employee allegations
of retaliatory conduct for opposing discrimination or being a
witness and/or otherwise testifying in any formal or informal
proceeding or investigation relative to an assertion of
discrimination.
V. CONCLUSION
To alleviate confusion among the courts as to the correct motivat-
ing-factor standard, the proposed standard purports to incorporate as
much of each existing standard as possible and could be used across
the board for all statutes prohibiting employment discrimination.
190. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
191. See id.; Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 94.
192. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 94–95.
193. Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 94.
194. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
195. Id. at 805.
196. See Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 94 (explaining methods of limiting
damages).
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Frankly, it should not be as difficult as it currently is to decipher what
standard applies to which statute, nor should parties be forced to util-
ize various standards for similarly worded statutes.  This problem is
exacerbated when a plaintiff asserts discrimination based upon multi-
ple statutory reasons, such as age and sex.  In such a situation, it is
nonsensical to expect an (ex) employee to argue, an employer to de-
fend, and a jury to understand that, in one instance the employee must
prove that sex was “a” motivating factor for the discriminatory treat-
ment, but, in another instance, that age was “the” motivating factor
for the discriminatory treatment.  Indeed, it is common that an em-
ployee could be discriminated against based upon more than one
characteristic, so the employee should not have to try and argue multi-
ple standards in the case (envision a woman being fired because the
manager believes that “old men should work until they get ready to
retire while old women should retire by age 60 so they can care for
their grandchildren and knit sweaters”).  Consistency makes sense.
However, this Author learned a long time ago that sense is not all that
common.  Hopefully, Congress will incorporate common sense and
work towards providing a more clearly articulated motivating-factor
test.
